Well, That Was Easy Money

We learn today that US Airways has withdrawn its offer to buy Delta Airlines for what turned out to be about $9.8 billion. As I noted back in November when this madness was announced at the lower value of about $8 billion, "US Airways doesn't have it and Delta isn't worth it." For that reason, I also expected Delta's creditors to leap at the offer (and dump the US Airways stock immediately upon doing so). But here's how the deal was undone:

US Airways dropped its hostile $9.8 billion bid for Delta on Wednesday after Delta's creditors threw their support behind the airline's plan to emerge from bankruptcy on its own.

Delta Air Lines Inc.'s official unsecured creditors committee said in a statement it reached its decision after a lengthy review of both Delta's proposal and US Airways Group Inc.'s proposal.

So it was the creditors who pulled the plug after "extensive discussions." That's a surprise.

What was not a surprise was that there was money to be made here by the ordinary investor. Here's a chart of US Airways' stock price over the past three months:

That big spike in the middle of November was the roughly 16 percent increase in the stock price when the announcement was made, plus some continued appreciation. This was very unusual--the classic result from the finance literature is that upon announcement, the acquirer's stock price is either unchanged or slightly lower. It is the target's stock price that goes up. The reason, I think, is that acquirers often overpay, probably because they overstate the amount of "synergies" they'll get from the acquisition.

I could see no reason for this acquisition to be such a good thing for US Airways, so I sold short. You can see that the position was not always in the black, but eventually, it seemed pretty clear that that gain would be reversed. I managed to pocket a cool 10 percent based on when I got in and out of the position.

GDP Growth in 2006, Q4

The BEA made its advance GDP release for the fourth quarter of 2006. Real GDP grew at an annual rate of 3.5 percent, up from 2.0 percent in the third quarter. This is a respectable pace, though I wish more of what we were seeing were driven by investment rather than consumption. The personal savings rate remains negative.

Optimal Saving?

Some students of mine referred me to an article by Damon Darlin in Saturday's New York Times which merits a Voxy for posing the question:

Could it be possible that you are saving too much for your retirement?

That's a fascinating question, and the article goes on to quote some of the economists who have done very interesting research on it, including Karl Scholz of Wisconsin and Larry Kotlikoff of Boston University. Here's the crux of the matter:

Nevertheless, a small band of economists from universities, research institutions and the government are clearly expressing the blasphemy that many Americans could be saving less than they are being told to by the financial services industry — and spending more — while they are younger. The negative savings rate, they say, is wildly distorted.

According to them, the financial industry, with its ostensibly objective online calculators, overstates how much money someone will need in retirement. Some, in fact, contend that financial firms have a pointed interest in persuading people to save much more than they need because the companies earn fees on managing that money.

The more realistic amount could be as little as half the typical recommendation made by Fidelity, Vanguard or any number of other financial institutions.

Here are the excerpts from the researchers:

The economists answer that people would get more out of their money by using it when they are younger. “There is risk in saving too much,” Mr. Kotlikoff said. “You could end up squandering your youth rather than your money.”

Mr. Scholz said he and his co-authors of a study, “Are Americans Saving ‘Optimally’ for Retirement?” found oversaving across all economic and education levels and most ethnic or racial groups as well. (It found that Hispanics tended to save less.) Those who were not saving enough were usually missing their target by only a small amount.

The one exception to this optimism involves people who enter retirement single, either because their spouse died early, they divorced, or they never married. The studies found this group did not save enough.

I think some of the confusion in the article is due to a focus in the financial planning community on how much people are saving rather than when they do it. I think typical households are forward-looking but very impatient. That they are forward-looking means that they will enter retirement largely without surprise or regret about what they can afford. That they are impatient means that they will delay most of the saving that will get them to that level of comfort until retirement is just a decade or so away.

So if you see a 50-year old with not that much in savings, how do you decide whether that's a 50-year old who is optimally waiting to save a lot over the next 10-15 years or a 50-year old who does not recognize the need to save for retirement?

Things I Don't Understand

1) Why every Boston cabbie thinks that the most direct route to/from Logan Airport and the North End is through the Ted Williams tunnel ...

2) How people can be taken seriously as candidates for President with exactly zero experience as an executive in prior public office and zero significant pieces of legislation to their credit at the national level ... Don't they have to, at least at some prior point in their political careers, have made a decision for which they were directly responsible for the consequences? Are we really that desperate?

How Long Does It Take for the Long Run To Arrive?

Some of the discussion from the last two posts has carried over to Mark Thoma's blog. Krugman responded to Mark as follows:

Aha - I was wondering if anyone would raise that. I was taking it as true to a pretty good approximation that the long-run supply curve for medical services is horizontal. Unless you think that there's permanently limited supply of medical education, or something, why should we think otherwise?

And I would guess that very few people would read Bush's statement to mean that it's bad if other people have extensive insurance, because it drives up doctors' paychecks.

So in a comment, I noted:

Based on Krugman's response (must be nice to have him on speed dial), we're now in the much more comfortable environment in which this is a few economists talking about the magnitude of various key parameters.

One could point out that if he was "wondering whether anyone would raise this point," then he seems to realize that he was going a bit overboard in claiming that "no economic analysis I'm aware of says that when Peter chooses a good health plan, he raises Paul’s premiums."

On the substantive point, one could assert that almost any market has a long-run supply curve that is flat. Exceptions would be made for markets like diamonds--there is a finite quantity available to be mined. At this juncture, it becomes quite relevant how long we think it will be before we are in the long run.

As evidence against this happening any time soon, I don't think the AMA is going to give up its near-monopoly on certifying medical practitioners. Licensed practitioners will be in short supply for a long time even if wholesale medical prices rise. In order to get more services when prices change over this long run, we have to build a lot of buildings--medical schools and hospitals--and fill them with really expensive equipment. I'm guessing that long run will take a while to get here.

A commenter on Mark's blog noted that we could allow more immigration of medical personnel, a policy to which I don't object. Chiming in, Brad DeLong posts his views:

It's not clear to me that Paul Krugman is wrong. It is also not clear to me that Paul Krugman is right. One of the things patients are buying with more expensive health-care plans is the freedom to choose their own doctors, and that gives the doctors they choose some monopoly power in their bargaining over reimbursement rates with the insurance companies.

I don't have a handle on how big this effect might be, however.

I think that makes four of us. I also think that Krugman's larger point about the key market failure being adverse selection rather than moral hazard is right, and I would like to stop having policy makers focus on the tax code to try to improve the health care market. As for constructive solutions, I hope to have more in future posts.

Why I Don't Like 529 Plans: Another Pecuniary Externality

Here's another tax-induced pecuniary externality that concerns me. The list price on college costs has been rising faster than inflation. This prompted politicians to act, and they created 529 plans to allow families to save for college in a tax-advantaged way. Austan Goolsbee has strongly and correctly criticized some of the design issues of these plans, particularly the administrative links to states and the (I think resulting) high management fees. For now, I just want to focus on how the tax advantage is distributed and its impact on future prices.

Contributions are made with after-tax dollars, sometimes with a state income tax deduction, but the returns on the portfolio compound tax-free and withdrawals are tax-free as long as they are used for college expenses. It's like a Roth IRA that way. (You can learn more here.) The benefits of the 529 plan accrue in proportion to a family's tax rate and desired amount of education expenses. Let's leave aside the almost surely positive correlation between (family) income and desired education expenses, which will reinforce the following points, and focus just on the simple fact that the tax rate increases with family income. It is more financially advantageous for a high-income family to invest a dollar in a 529 plan than it is for a low-income family to do so.

But you might say, "Okay, but doesn't the low-income family still get a benefit?" The answer depends on whether you think the supply curve for education is flat or upward sloping. Do you believe that colleges, when faced with dedicated accounts like 529 plans that will pay a penalty if they are not used on college costs, will raise their list prices? About 20 years ago, the conjecture that they would was named the "Bennett Hypothesis," after then-Secretary of Education William J. Bennett, who decried the tendency for colleges to raise tuition prices when the federal government stepped up its financial aid programs. I have little doubt that it is true.

The pecuniary externality comes in when we think about how much the tuition will go up. What drives that? I'd argue that it will be the average size of a 529 plan, as would be the case in any market responding to an increase in consumers' willingness to pay for a good. Since the tax advantage is positively related to income, even if all of the money going into 529 plans were new saving, it would be the higher income families that would have the larger-than-average 529 balances and the lower income families that would have the smaller-than-average 529 balances. (If the higher income families are simply shifting money from other accounts to 529 plans, then this strengthens the argument.)

Putting this all together, we can infer that the list price increases in college costs could outstrip the capacity of low-income families to pay them from their 529 plans. Depending on how much colleges raise their list prices and how the details of financial aid programs work out, lower income families may be worse off by the presence of 529 plans, even if they are saving through them. It is not the low-income families' own 529 plans that make them worse off--it is the high-income families' 529 plans and their greater benefits to using them. The impact of the latter on the price is the tax-induced pecuniary externality.

It's lousy public policy. But as much as I don't like these plans as a policy instrument, I have one for each of my two children. It doesn't make sense financially to leave the money on the table, given what's going to happen to list prices.

Pecuniary Externalities

For what it's worth, I think Paul Krugman makes some good points about the problems inherent in using the tax code to encourage or discourage the purchase of health insurance in his column today (original here, reposted here). I obviously don't sign on to his characterizations of "Bush and his advisers," and he stops short of his usual call for a single-payer system, so there's no reason to get into that today.

Were it up to me, I'd completely eliminate the exclusion of health insurance premiums from taxable income. That levels the playing field between premiums and other expenses (as the Bush plan tries to do), but it does so without forcing the tax code to be the arbiter of whether something was a legitimate health expenditure or not. It also raises tens of billions of dollars in additional tax revenue that can then be directed to all the other things the government needs to pay for.

However, I found this statement (highlighted in bold) in Krugman's column to be odd:

While proposing this high-end tax break, Mr. Bush is also proposing a tax increase — not on the wealthy, but on workers who, he thinks, have too much health insurance. The tax code, he said, “unwisely encourages workers to choose overly expensive, gold-plated plans. The result is that insurance premiums rise, and many Americans cannot afford the coverage they need.”

Again, wow. No economic analysis I’m aware of says that when Peter chooses a good health plan, he raises Paul’s premiums. And look at the condescension. Will all those who think they have “gold plated” health coverage please raise their hands?

Is he kidding me? That is almost the definition of a pecuniary externality. Wikipedia describes it as follows:

A pecuniary externality is an externality which operates through prices rather than through real resource effects. For example, an influx of city-dwellers buying second homes in a rural area can drive up house prices, making it difficult for young people in the area to get onto the property ladder.

This is in contrast with real externalities which have a direct resource effect on a third party. For example, pollution from a factory directly harms the environment.

Both pecuniary and real externalities can be either positive or negative.

So in the President's defense, there's a very simple argument to be made here. When one person feels inclined, for whatever reason, to purchase more health care services, that puts upward pressure on the price of health care services (if the supply curve is not flat) and thus the cost to everyone else in the market. Normally, we don't pay any attention to this, because that is precisely the mechanism by which a competitive market achieves economic efficiency.

The President is referring to the pecuniary externality generated by a tax distortion in the treatment of health insurance, which interferes with a market achieiving economic efficiency and thus should concern us. It goes as follows. Premiums are fully excludable from income tax, but out-of-pocket expenses are not tax advantaged. That favors health insurance arrangements in which there are low deductibles and high premiums. Such arrangements can lead to higher utilization of health services, since the insured faces no financial cost at the margin once the low deductible has been met. (This is just a standard moral hazard argument.) Krugman may not believe that the relevant behavioral effects are large here, but he's on shaky ground with his "Wow ... no economic analysis ..." comment.

For more on pecuniary externalities, I came across this source.